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This report is in four parts: 
'I.  The reasons for strengthening international cooperation in  competition policy. 
II.  .  The European Union's recent experiences in  bilateral cooperation. 
III.  The inadequate nature of present international cooperation. 
IV.  The Group's recommendations for  improving international  cooperation and the 
application of."competition policy niles.  ·  · 
The  names  of the  members  of the  group as  well  as  the  text of the  letter of convocation are 
annexed to this report. 
2 I.  THE  REASONS  FOR  STRENGTHENING  INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION IN COMPETITION POLICY 
Markets  have  become  more  and  more  open  since  the  Second  World  War.  As  a 
consequence ofeight rounds of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), barriers to trade such as· tariffs have been brought down to historicillly · 
low·levels.  Where original GATT tariffs· were situated around 35%, the average weighted 
import duty on industrial goods for trading partners like the EU, the US and Japan will 
be below 4% as the results of the Uruguay Round are fully  implemented.  About 40% 
of imports  into  these· markets  will  be  free  of duties.  In  parallel  to  'this  multilateral 
development, bilateral and regional  free trade agreements have also flourished. 
As barriers to trade have come down, both in  ~he form  of tariffs and through disciplines 
on  non-tariff barriers, the growth of world  trade  has  surpassed the growth of national 
economies  by  on  average  2%  per  year.  Trade  has  becom·e  the  motor  of economic 
expanston. 
The effect of liberalization has  been,  at the micro-economic level, to impose structural 
changes on international economic activity.  Business has become global, as firms have 
sought to take advantage of new markets and new production opportunities.  Integrated 
. international  production  methods  have. increasingly  been  adopted,  whereb'y  the 
comparative advantage of different countries or regions is exploited to the full.  At the 
level of finished products, companies facing competition from a new competitor on their 
home  market  have  sought  new  markets  abroad  to  maintain  profitability  and 
competitiveness. 
The effect of these twin  developments  of liberalization  and  globalization  has  been to 
interconnect the different markets of the world; without their being fully integrated. · 
While in  the  liberal  post Uruguay  Round  trading  system  the  effective  application  of 
competition law becomes an important contributor to creating and maintaining operi and  · 
accessible markets, and thus to enhancing the stability of the system, there are as yet no· 
binding rules relating to the practices of  private firms at the multilateral level.  Moreover, 
the effective application of competition law is a basic feature of  open market economies -
yet  absent  in  the  present  framework  of international  rules  - and  should  be further 
consolidated.  It  is  against  this  background  that  a  strengthening.  of  international 
cooperation between competition authorities and a first harmonization of certain national 
rules and procedures is  recommended. 
There are several further reasons justifying such an  approach. 
1. 
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Given the globalization of the economy,  there  are  rriore  and  more  competition 
problems which transcend national boundaries: international cartels, export cartels, · 
restrictive practices in  fields  which  are  international  by  nature  (e.g.  air  or sea 
transport, etc.), mergers on  a world scale (e.g. BT-MCI
2
), or even the abuse of a· 
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3 dominant  pos1t10n  on  several  major  markets  (e.g.  the  Microsoft  case
3
). 
Competition authorities therefore have a  prime interest in  cooperating to solve 
these. problems  together  1n  order  to  enhance  the  effective  enforcement  of 
competition rules. 
2.  As  a  result of a  lack of rules  at  international  level,  firms  which  are  pre~ent in 
several  countries are  sometimes subject to different national  competition rules. 
Procedures, time limits and the criteria for taking decisions can vary consideraBly. 
It is even possible for a merger or a concerted practice to be authorized in  one 
country  and  prohibited  in  another.  These  differences  push  up  costs  (more 
procedures, higher legal costs, etc.) and increase uncertainties and may therefore 
constitute  barriers  (sometimes  major  ones)  to  the  expansion  of trade  and  of 
international investment. 
3.  In  some countries action  against anticompetitive practices is  less  rigorous  than 
in  others and distortions may result.  Also the anticompetitive practices tolerated 
by one competition authority sometimes result in access to the market concerned 
being  closed,  even  though  foreign  firms  could  provide  additional  competition 
which would be beneficial to the consumers of that country.  · 
4.  Some countries have sought to remedy such problems by extending the territorial 
scope of their competition rules.  However,  this  approach  can  lead to  conflicts 
between competition authorities.  In the absence of  international cooperation, there 
are  also  legal  and  practical  obstacles  to  seeking  on  foreign  territory  the 
information necessary to establish the existence of infringements.  There is  then 
a risk of a  competition authority  having to  abandon  prosecution of the alleged 
infringements for lack of sufficient proof. 
5.  Developing countries in particular have an  interest in ensuring effective controls 
on  anti-competitive behaviour.  .  The worldwide lowering,  in  the context of the 
Uruguay Round, of  governmental  market access barriers for trade in goods and 
services,  trade-related investment measures and intellectual  property rights may 
leave them more exposed to the risk of.anticompetitive practices.  In the absence 
of  appropriate  domestic  rules,  they  may  also  risk  being  subjected  to  the 
extraterritorial application of other countries' competition laws. 
All  these problems are liable to  undermine the  positive results of the Uruguay Round 
agreements.  This is  why,  as  we shall  see  lafer,  the Agreement establishing the World 
Trade  Organization  (WTO)  contains  a  number  of rules  relating  to  competition.  In 
addition, in negotiations under the aegis of the WTO, recommendations have been made 
to deepen the competition aspects of the trade-related provisions (e.g.  those concerning 
commercial monopolies, trade in  services, intellectual property rights and "trade related 
investment measures").  All the same, a more systematic and more complete approach to 
restrictions  on  competition  resulting  from  the  activities  of commercial  firms  is  still 
necessary. 
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·4 II.  THE EXPERIENCES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION WITH REGARD TO · 
COOPERATION 
.  ' 
The European. Union  has  a  wealth  of experience  in  cooperation  between  competition 
authorities  and  in  the  development  and  enforcement  of  internationatty  applicable 
competition rules. 
· 1.  Cooperation within the European Union 
4 
s 
In  accordance with the texts in force
4  Member State competition authorities are 
associated  with  the  procedures  carried  out  by  the  Commission  under  its  own 
'competition powers. 
The fottowing provisions are particularly significant in the context of the present 
report: 
the most important documents in each case, including certain information 
of a confidential nature obtained  by the Commission from  fi'rms,  are to . 
be  transmitted  to  the~e  competition  authorities,  which  can  also  be  ' 
represented at the oral  hearings of firms; 
these authorities may make their opinions known on the draft decisions in 
individual cases within the Advisory Committees on Restrictive Practices 
· and Dominant Positions and the Advisory Committee on Merger Control; 
. Member State authorities may assist the Commission, at its request, during 
. investigations  carried out  on  the premises of firms;  or may  themselves 
carry out the investigations requested by the Commission; 
Furthermore, the development of competition law,  now extended to. all  Member. 
States,  and  the  establishment  of  national'- administrative  authorities  together 
increase  the  opportunities  for  cooperation  between  these  authorities  and  the 
. Commission
5
.  Such opporti.mities ·are today  exploited more widely than before, 
whether by leaving it to the national authorities, when they are in thebes~ position 
to do·so,  to enforce their own or Community legislation to  company activities 
See EEC Council Regulation No  17 (OJ No 13, 21.2.1962, p.204) and Regulation No  99/63/EEC 
of the  Commission (OJ No  127,  20.8.1963,  p.2268).  Similar provisions are  contained  in the 
Regulations applying Articles 85 arid 86 to the various transport sectors and in Council Regulation 
(EEC)  No 4064/89  (OJ No  L 395,  30.12.1989,  p.1  corrected  by  OJ  L  257  of  1990)  and 
Commission Regulation (EEC)  No  3384/94 (OJ No  L 377, 31.12.1994, p.1) on concentrations. 
A  distinction  should  be  made  between  cooperation  between  the  Community  and  national 
competition authorities  and the  application by  national  courts of Community  law,  which  the 
Commission encourages (  cf Notice on cooperation between national courts and the· Commission, 
which was adopted in 1992; OJ No  C 39,  13.2.1993, p.6).  · 
5 which could be dealt with by the Commission
6
,  or by, for example, calling on the 
resources of the national authorities to initiate the investigation of cases on which 
the Commission may reserve the right to act itself at a later stage. 
Thus  some  of the  main  aspects  of international  cooperation  in  the  field  of 
competition  (exchange  of confidential  information,  one  competition  authority 
being able  to  make  its  point  of view  known  to  another competition  authority 
which  is  handling  a  case  affecting  the  first  authority's  interests,  machinery 
whereby  two authorities can  agree on  the allocation  of a  case  on  the basis  of 
criteria such as the resources available or the location of the "centre of gravity" 
of the company behaviour in  question~ etc.) have been or are being,  in  varying 
degrees, experimented with within the Union, and increasingly so in the last few 
years. 
2.  Cooperation with the other countries of Europe 
Apart from the experience gained within the Union, the Union has embarked on 
a process of close cooperation with neighbouring oountries. 
2.1  An elaborate model  of cooperation was established under the Agreement on the 
European  Economic  Area  (EEA),  involving  a  full  exchange  of information 
between the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the Commission for cases 
concerning both the signatory EFTA countries and the Community. The ESA and 
the Commission are even each entitled to formulate an opinion in the proceedings 
brought  before  the  other  authority.  This  situation  was  made  possible  by  a 
Protocol  to  the  Agreement  derogating  from  the  normal  Community  rules  on 
confidentiality. 
2.2. 
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The  accession  to  the  Union  of Austria,  Finland,  and  Swe9en  will  admittedly 
reduce the practical scope of these provisions in the future, but do not deprive the 
EEA arrangements of their value as a model for future international cooperation 
agreements. 
With the Central and East European Countries  (CEECs) cooperation is provided 
for  in  the  implementing  rules  introduced  under  the  Europe  Agreements.  The 
Commission and the competition authority of each country concerned undertake 
in  particular to  notify  one  another  of the  cases  they  are  handling  which  also 
concern  the  other  authority.  However,  the  authorities  are  not  obliged  to 
communicate information where its transmission would be prohibited by law or 
incompatible with their respective interests.  Each authority further undertakes to 
take account of the other's observations and to seek mutually acceptable solutions. 
On the basis of Article 9(3) of Council Regulation No 17 (OJ No  l3, 21.2.1962, p.204) and similar 
provisions in the equivalent sectoral Regulation$ or, for concentrations, on the basis of the referral 
procedure laid down in Article 9 of Regulation (EEC)  No  4064/89). 
6 3.  Cooperation with the United States 
3 .1.  Another  illustrative  example  of  cooperation  IS  the  Agreement  between  the 
European  Communities  and·  the  Government  of  the'  United  .States  of 
23  September 1991
7
.  The  content  of this  agreement  may  be  summarized  as 
follows: 
Article II requires each Party to notify the other whenever the enforcement 
activities of one of the Parties may affect the "important interests" of the 
other Party.  The text alsp specifies the time at which this notification is 
to be made~ 
'  Article IV provides for cooperation and coordination in  the enforcement 
of the competition rules; 
.- Article V contains a provision on  "positive comity".  This is probably the 
most innovative aspect. of the Agreement:  either Party  may  request  th~ 
other to act, on the basis of its own powers, to investigate activities which 
adversely affect important interests of the first Party.  The notified PartY 
is free to decide whether to undertake enforcement activities, but if'it does 
so it is obliged to advise the first  Party of the outcome. 
Article VI contains the principle of "negative comity",  which states that 
when each Party acts, it has to take into account importantinterests of the 
other Party. 
lastly, Article VIII provides that the Agreement shall not derogate from the 
confidentiality rules of  each of the Parties. 
3 .2.  This Agreement has  resulted in a large number of notifications, the content of 
which is  relatively limited because of its purely factual  nature. 
3.3. 
7 
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Bilateral  meetings and  many  other contacts  also take  place,  mainly  to discuss 
priorities with regard to effective enforcement and cooperation on specific cases. 
Nonetheless, it is  clear that the ban on  exchanging confidential .information has 
created a major obstacle to close cooperation.  · 
The Microsoft case (summer 1994) is unusual fro111:  this point of  view, in that tbe 
· company consented to an  exchange of such information.  This permitted  closer 
cooperation whereby the two competition authorities jointly negotiated an eventual 
settl em ent
8
.  ·  · 
See OJ L95 of 27.4.1995 as corrected by  OJ L 134 of 20.6.95 
The recent decision of the Federal District Court not to approve the consent order as being in the 
public interest has  no  consequences for the  undertaking  given by  Microsoft to  the  European 
Commission. which stands independently of the US  remedy. 
7 3.4  It should be noted that in November 1994 the United States Congress adopted the 
International  Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act,  which contains a provision 
permitting  the  conclusion  by  the  US  competition  authorities  of international_ 
agreements  providing for  the  exchange  of confidential  information,  provided 
certain conditions are met. ·n is also worthy of note that on the basis of this  new 
law, the US authorities could provide information to the competition  authorities 
of countries whose important interests are affected by anticompetitive  behaviour 
organized within the US, but which is ·not illegal under US law. 
4.  Cooperation with other third countries 
9 
Cooperation with other competition authorities is at present far less developed and 
gives  rise  to  a  simple  exchange  of  notifications  under  the  1986  OECD 
recommendation (see Annex 6
9
)  and to informal consultations in a limited number 
of cases. 
With Japan, cooperation has started through the organization ofbilateral meetings 
in which subjects of common interest are discussed (review of recent legislation, 
discussions  on  particular  sectors  and  cases)  and  the  organization  of  public . 
seminars in  which experts,  and business and consumer representatives take part. 
The first seminar took place in Tokyo in November 1993 and the second was held 
in Brussels on  16  September 1994. 
Links  with  authorities  in  Canada,  Australia  and  New  Zealand  have  been 
established in  the  same way  but substantive cooperation needs to be developed 
further.  In  addition,  on  the  basis  of an  authorization  from  the  Council,  the 
Commission has just begun negotiations with the Canadian  authorities with the 
aim of concluding a cooperation agreement. 
References to numbered annexes relate to the set of annexes published in parallel with this report. 
8 m.  LIMITS  TO  PRESENT  INTERNATIONAL  COOPERATION  IN  TilE 
FIELD OF COMPETITION 
1.  Bilateral coope~ation still too limited 
10 
11 
12. 
In contrast to the USA, the number of  inter~ational bilateral antitrust cooperation, 
agreements and  mutual  legal  assistance agreements concluded by the European 
Communities remains very limited.  Apart from the restrictions with regard to the 
exchange of confidential  information
10  already  mentioned, the limits to existing 
instances of  cooperation (in particular between the European Union and the United 
States and  between the European Union and Japan) are mainly due to the fact 
that competition law and its enforcement differ as between partners. For example, 
the  purpose  of Community  law,  via  competition,  is  not  only  to  increase the 
efficiency of firms  or to  improve the  allocation  of resources,  but also to bring 
about the integration of the internal market. The latter concern is not so pressing 
or non-existent in  the United  States.  This  results  in  a  different approach,  for 
example, to vertical  restraints or the abuse of a dominant position.  · 
Similarly the implementation of competition policy is not always, either in degree 
or in its practical implementation, independent of the general policies of a given 
country.  Thus United States competition policy has evolved in  ways which.are 
not necessarily reflected on  this  side of the Atlantic.
11
·  Differences in  policy or 
in  the  manner of implementation  of competition  rules  also  exist  between  the 
European Communities and other of its partners. 
· Furthermore,  in the case of bilateral  cooperation between the European Union 
· and  the United  States,  it appears  that  the  ambitious· provisions of the  existing 
Agreement have not (yet) been fully exploited.  In particular it still remains to be 
seen  how far the "comity"  procedures are really ·likely to influence competition 
· authorities'  natural  propensity  not  to  be concerned  with  the  external  effects of 
their decisions. Despite recent court decisions
12 and views expressed some months 
ago  by. the United  States  competition  authorities,  it is  important to  avoid  an 
unduly  restrictive interpretation of the  concept of comity which would make it 
applicable only  in  the  (rare)  cases  of "pure conflict"  of law,  i.e.  when  a  firm 
cannot  comply  with  the  requirements  _imposed  by.  one  jurisdiction'  except by 
infringing the law of another jurisdiction.  Given the importance ofth~ Agreement 
between the European Communities and the United "states,  it is to be hoped that. 
Cooperation between Canada and  the  U;uted  States  does,  however,  include  the  exchange of 
confidential information for cases pertaining to criniinal law. 
It should be noted that 'the guidelines of the competition authorities give an imperfect reflection 
of the real effects of a·pplying the mles in force.  The role  played by  the national courts, which 
can vary  in importance, depending on the country, should be taken into account. 
Cffor example the 1993 judgment of  the United States Supreme Court in Hartford Fire Insurance 
Co v.  California, 113  S.Ct. 2909. 
9 its most promising provisions will be fully exploited and that the way will not be 
open  for an  excessive unilateral  enforcement of competition rules. 
2.  The absence of an  international framework for  competition  and 
of common rules accepted worldwide 
The post war Havana Charter was a first attempt to introduce competition rules 
into the international  arena but failed when the Charter was hot ratified by the 
principal  countries  concerned~  Since  then  efforts  to  create .  an  international 
competition rules framework have run aground and this despite the provisions of 
the 1986 OECD recommendation on  cooperation between member countries on 
restrictive business practices affecting international trade.  The situation today 
is one where the circulation of information and cooperation between competition 
authorities are inadequate. 
Unlike other areas, and especially the area of international trade thanks to the role 
of the  World  Trade  Organization,  there  are  no  conciliation  and  arbitration 
procedures  relating  to  anticompetitive  practices. in  the  event  of disputes  and 
differences. 
The immediate result is that competition authorities have less incentive to achieve 
practical  results through bilateral  cooperation and especially through an  equally 
strict  enforcement  of  competition  rules  or  a  harmonization  of  rules  and 
procedures.  In particular a strict competition authority generally has difficulty 
in influencing a less strict authority through  bilateral cooperation. 
It should be noted, however, that at the Ministerial Meeting in Marrakesh in April 
1994 which concluded the Uruguay Round and established the WTO, competition 
policy was explicitly mentioned as an area for which a rules framework could be 
drawn up. The WTO Agreement also provides that its Council for Trade in Goods 
·shall, not later than five years after the date of entry into force of the Agreement 
on  1 January 1995,  consider whether the  multilateral  rules  with  provisions on 
competition  should  be  complemented  (Article 9  of  the  Agreement  on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures).  As for the Agreement on Trade in Services, 
it  already  has  some  rules  dealing  with  business  ·practices  which  restrict 
competition  (Articles  VIII  and  IX).  The  Agreement  on  TRIPS  also  includes 
various articles (e.g.  ~rticles 8,  39 and 40) recognizing the need for competition 
rules so as  to prevent abuses of intellectual  property  rights and anticompetitive 
practices in contractual licences.  In the accession negotiations with (former) State 
trading countries there is  increasing concern  about the  need  to supplement the 
inadequate GATT. rules on  state trading enterprises by  additional  guarantees of 
market access and undistorted competition.  An opportunity for multilateral action 
has therefore been created, which should be exploited more fully. 
10 IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS  OF  THE  GROUP  FOR  IMPROVING 
INTERNATIONAL  COO  PERt\  TION  AND  THE  ENFORCEM:ENT  OF 
COMPETITION POLICY RULES 
The Group examined the various possible options for improving international cooperation 
in the area of competition policy.  · 
Before weighing these options it must be recognized that the way in which competition 
functions  on  international  markets  may  be  affected  either  because of the  action  (or 
inaction) 'of countries, or because of company practices. 
As  far  as  the  responsibility  of countries  is  concerned;  competitiOn  on  international 
markets may be affected either by specific actions (e.g. the enactment of national rules 
which limit the ability of  foreign business to compete, the implementation of  rules which 
discriminate against foreign competitors, the organization of  export cartels, the exemption 
of c.ertain  sectors of activity from  the scope of competition law, etc.),  or by a:  lack of 
action (e.g.  because there is no national competition law, or it is not. implemented}. 
As for company practices liable to restrict competition on international' markets, several 
types of situation can be identified: 
collective  practices  of firms  located  in  different  countries  which  affect  both 
domestic competition in the various. countries concerned and international trade 
(e.g.  international cartels); 
collective practices which emanate from firms in the same country and affect the 
ability  of foreign  firms  to  penetrate  the  country  concerned.  These  may  be 
,prohibited  practices  such  as  national  cartels,  but·  also  practices 'which  are  not 
necessarily a barrier to competition in that country 6r are not considered contrary 
to national competition law (such as certain vertical practices· between producers 
and distributors); 
restrictive practices which emanate from  firms in the same country and restrict 
competition in one or more. other countries (e.g. export agreements or the abuse 
of dominant positions)  . 
. ·The various types.of restrictions on international competition mentioned ab.ove may pose 
different problems from the point of view o~ regulating competition internationally. 
For example, in the case of an international cartel, there may be an agreement between. 
the  competition  authorities  of the  countries  concerned  on  initiating prosecutions  ~ut 
problems may arise concerning competence (which authority  has to act) and evidence 
(investigation by the designated authority implies that it has powers of  discovery outside 
its own jurisdiction in the countries in which the other members of the cartel are located). 
A  framework  for  cooperation  between  competition  authorities  and· for· an  exchange 
information is then necessary. 
Conversely,  when  the  practices  in  question  emanate  from  firms  located  chiefly  or 
exclusively in a specific country, that country's authorities will  generally be in the best 
11 position to take action against the practice whose effects will either be chiefly felt outside 
the country  (in  the  case of an  export cartel  or  an  abuse  of a  dominant  position  on 
international markets by a firm situated in the country concerned) or felt both inside and 
outside  the  country  concerned  (in  the  case,  for  example,  of horizontal  or vertical 
restrictive practices which limit the ability  of foreign  firms to export into the country 
concerned and restrict competition in  that country). 
In these  last examples,  the international  community  still  needs to  have  the  power to 
ensure that the authorities of  the country in which the offending firms are located will act 
to eliminate the anticompetitive practice.  In the absence of an international authority with 
investigatory and enforcement powers in  all  countries, the country in which the firms in 
question are located will  itself need to have a competition law enabling it to deal  with 
the problem and an appropriate dispute settlement mechanism is needed at international 
level  so that the victims of the practice can be sure that the implementation of the law 
is effective and non-discriminatory. 
It seems therefore that a combination of several  options is  required in  order to combat 
anticompetitive practices which have international effects. 
The Group more particularly examined in  turn: 
the possibility of establishing an  international authority responsible for ensuring 
the implementation of a worldwide competition code, an option which may be a 
long-term project (cf par.  IV. I); 
the scope for developing bilateral cooperation, which is essential but  insufficient 
(cf.  par. IV.2); 
the progressive construction of  a PI uri lateral Agreement on Competition and Trade 
combining  common  principles  (these  principles  could  be incorporated  in  the 
national laws of participating countries) and  an arbitration structure.This project 
is ambitious, but the Group considers that the.Union and its chief partners could 
usefully start to study it right away (cf.  par.  IV.3). 
1.  International  competition  authority  and  worldwide  competition 
code: a long-term option 
For  future  reference,  the  Group  discussed  the  drafting  of  an  international 
competition code superimposed on  national  laws,  including the establishment of 
a  single authority  responsible for  its implementation.  But the  Group does not 
consider this a realistic short or medium-term option.  A considerable effort to 
make existing  national  laws  more  convergent  (along the  lines  of the  OECD's 
work) is a prerequisite to any moves in this direction.  Similarly, only a lasting 
and fruitful experience of  closer cooperation between national authorities retaining 
the full  scope of their powers will  create a climate of confidence which would 
make the loss of  sovereignty involved in  this option acceptable. 
12 Without  elaborating  further  on  the  possible  advantages  of  this  long-te1Jll 
objective/
3  the  Group  considers  that  it  is  more  appropriate  at  this  stage  to 
concentrate on  the  intermediate  stages.  In  particular,  it feels  that one  should 
commence with the introduction of an adequate set of competition rules by those 
countries that do  not yet have one;  and  countries which have already acquired 
·experience in  this area should provide  more assistance  to  developing countries 
requiring it. 
2.  The' strengthening of bilateral cooperation is essential 
2.1  In  recent years,  many  bilateral  agreements  have  been  signed:  United  States  -
Australia, Australia - New Zealand, United States  - Canada, Germany - United 
States, United States - European Communities, etc.  Other agreements are being 
negotiated. 
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Competition  authorities'  commitment  to  this  type  of cooperation  is  directed 
· initially at facilitating the detection of restrictive practices  which operate or have 
effects  across  borders,  and  at  avoiding  conflicts  that  result  from  the 
extra-territorial  enforcement  of national  competition  laws.  This  enhances  the 
"negative  comity"  approach  which  traditionally  tends  to  limit  one  country's 
implementation of legal measures where the important interests of another country 
might  be  affected.  Henceforth,  such  self-restraint  must  be  extended  to 
circumstances in which the first country refrains from acting in order to assist the 
action of its better-placed partner in  putting an  end to a restrictive situation with 
transborder effects.  The application of  the "negative comity" principle should not, 
therefore, result in a lower level of enforcement of competition rules but, on the 
contrary,  in  the  use  in  each  case  of the  most  appropriate  instruments  by  the  -
competition authority which is better placed in this respect.  In addition increased 
cooperation among competition authorities, ~nd in particular the  "positive comity" 
mechanism,. makes  a  significant  contribution  to  attaining  the  objectives  of 
successive GATT rounds.  (This mechanism  enables one competition authority 
·to request the partner country's competition authority  to act in order to  put an end 
to behaviour which  may,  for  example,  prevent access to that partner country's 
market.)  It is this approach which makes it possible to pursue the objectives- of. 
international  action  in  this area:  a more effective enforcement of competition 
rules which should have. the effect of checking trends towards an  extra-territorial. 
enforcement of national  rules;  the creation  of conditions favouring  the gradual 
- alignment of different- laws, which  will  enhance the legal  security for firms and 
reduce their costs;  and  the promotion of equal  conditions of competition in  all 
countries. All these factors are likely to favour the opening up of markets and the · 
expansion of international trade. 
Cf in particular the report published on 26  January by the Commission on Global Governance (see 
Chapter 4).  -
13 Cooperation between competition authorities will  not,  in the foreseeable future, 
make  it possible  to  relinquish  trade  protection  instruments.  However,  as  the 
effectiveness of cooperation increases, instances of conflict likely to lead to the 
use of these instruments will  decrease. 
2.2  The EU's most interesting experience of  bilateral cooperation so far has developed 
under the aforementioned agreement with the United States.  Although positive, 
.this experience remains nonetheless limited in scope. 
The Group considers that cooperation should as a priority be taken turther, both 
because  of the  importance  of transatlantic  relations  and  because  of the  role 
fulfilled by the EC/US agreement as a model for the development of cooperation 
between each of the two partners and other countries in the world. Primarily this 
implies a commitment by the parties not to act unilaterally unless all  the means 
provided by comity have been exhausted; it also implies, on a reciprocal basis, the 
elimination  of current  obstacles  relating  to  confidentiality  rules  applicable  to 
exchanges of  information.  On the United States side the recent adoption of a new 
law on the matter should reduce the scope of  this problem.  On the European side 
the protection of confidential data is guaranteed by Community regulations. The 
European  Communities  are  entitled  nonetheless  to  conclude  an  international 
agreement  which,  under  the  procedure  and  in  return  for  certain  negotiated 
guarantees, derogates from  the internal rules they have laid down. 
While the Group considers that the deepening of the EC/US agreement should be 
a  priority  for  the  Commission's  action  in  the  months  ahead,  it  also  feels  it 
appropriate  to  establish  a  network  of bilateral  agreements  with  other  partner 
countries  taking  into  account the  specific  nature  of each  case  - and  primarily 
Japan,  in view of its ·economic importance and the volume of its trade with the 
Community.·  The Group is  also  convinced that  the establishment of bilateral 
agreements would serve as a good example for countries whose anti~trust activity 
may  so  far have seemed insufficiently strong;  it is  therefore of the view that a 
network of bilateral  agreements should,  as  soon as  possible,  extend beyond the 
circle  of countries  which  are  today  the  most  "activist"  in  the  enforcement of 
competition policies.  From this point of view a "positive comity"  procedure as 
envisaged by the European Communities-United States Agreement should come 
into general use. 
3.  The Group's main  recommendation:  the gradual construction of 
a plurilateral agreement· 
Despite their great value in the more effective application of competition rules to 
transborder restrictive practices, bilateral agreements cannot in themselves suffice 
to  solve  all  problems:  while  they  enable  a  closer  coordination  of action  -
especially if the confidentiality constraint were lifted,  even if only in  part - and 
provide  a  framework  for  reconciling  divergent  approaches  or  concerns,  these 
agreements are not vehicles of  conflict resolution.  Although the incipient dialogue 
which  is  established  between . the  parties  helps  to  bring  the  practices  of 
14 competition· authorities  closer together,  even  on  the basis of rules  which  may 
originally be far apart (e.g. the treatment vertical restraints on either side .of the 
Atlantic), it cannot replace the need to agree on basic principles relating to their 
enforcement.  The Group considers, in particular, that commercial frictions may 
remain unresolved in the absence of a dispute settlement procedure b~sed on a  set 
of jointly  determined  competition  rules.  It is also  difficult  to  imagine the 
. emergence of a level playing. field if this were to be be founded only on a group 
of inevitably heterogeneous bilateral agreements. 
For these reasons the Group is  of the view that a framework based on a set of 
comrrion rules and a dispute settlement procedure is necessary to: 
ensure that restrictive practices which are implemented and have effects 
across borders are effectively monitored; · 
contain the risks of commercial frictions resulting from  the heterogeneity 
(or even t.he  absence) of. national competition policies. 
To this end, the Group recommends the elaboration of a plurilateral  agreement, 
-comprising a new structure designed to resolve difficulties between contracting 
.  ·parties and between competition authorities~ Three major issues have to be tackled 
in order to achieve this: 
geographical coverage of the agreement 
determination of common rules 
· establishment of a new structure 
The Group  is  of the  view  that  each  of these  problems  can  be overcome  by 
· adopting  a  "building-block"  approach  within  the  framework  of a  plurilateral 
agreement on cooperation. 
3.1  Geographical coverage of  the agreement 
The geographical coverage of the agreement should be wide enough to include the 
main trading partners at world level, in order to reduce the distortions which may 
result from  differences in  the enforcment of competition rules. 
3 .1.1.  At the present time there are three areas within  which  very  dose cooperation 
already exists in the field of competition: 
United States and Canada (particularly with regard to the prosecution  of 
criminal infringements)  · 
Australia-New Zealand (an agreement providing for the _l)armqnization of 
competition laws,  and cooperation and exchange of information between 
the  national  competition  authorities;  the  agreement  goes  so  far  as  to 
provide, in some circumstances, for  these ~o  countries to be integrated 
in a single jurisdiction)  · 
the European Communities and their partners in the European Economic 
Area;  this  group  is  being  enlarged  by  the  Central  and  East European 
15 Countries (CEECs), which are linked to the EC by  agreements providing 
for  close  cooperation  on  the  basis  of Community  competition  rules; 
(similar  agreements  could  be  concluded  with  certain  countries  in  the 
Mediterranean basin). 
Between these three areas  "bridges"  exist (or are being-established) such  as  the 
EC-United States agreement, the draftEC-Canada agreement, the Australia-United 
States agreement, the Germany-United St~tes agreement or the draft France-United 
States  agreement.  Despite  the  inclusion  of important  provisions  (such  as  the 
"positive comity"  provision in  the EC-United  States Agreement or in the draft 
EC-Canada agreement) these agreements are more limited in  scope in that they 
do not provide for the possibility to exchange confidential information.  However, 
even if this problem of "interconnection" still has to be overcome, it is clear that 
all the countries concerned, in view of their experience in the field of cooperation, 
should logically be among the founder members of any  plurilateral  structure. 
3.1.2  Nevertheless,  the  goal  of this  structure  would  not  be  achieved  if it  did  not 
integrate  Japan  or  the  other  Asian  industrialized  countries  and  certain  Latin 
Arneiican countries, if necessary over time.  The United States and the European 
Union in  particular have taken  or are taking· retaliatory  trade measures against 
these countries for behaviour considered to be  unfair. All  the same it is clear that 
the  establishment  of a  plurilateral  competition  discipline  will  not lead  to the 
abandonment of trade protection instruments,  if only because the effects of the 
new system will  make themselves felt gradually.  Moreover, the implementation 
of competition  policy  cannot in  all  cases  by  itself lead  to  the  opening up  of 
markets. 
Nevertheless  tt  ts  clear  that  as  and  when  it  becomes  effective  the  stricter 
enforcement of competition rules, stimulated by  international pressure, will  have 
to be taken into account by those respon.sible for trade policy. 
3.1.3.  In taking account of these factors,  the Group recommends: 
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as a first stage, the negotiation of a plurilateral agreement within a group 
of countries,  which  might  consist  of the  OECD  countries  (including 
Mexico  which  has  recently  become  a  member),  the  central  and  east 
European countries,  and, for example, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and 
Taiwan.  Other countries could also participate in  the agreement and its 
negotiation  provided  they  were  ready  to  accept  the  same  rights  and 
obligations. 
the extension as soon as possible of this agreement to the most advanced 
countries in Latin America. 
On the global  level,  this goal  could  be  achieved  by  concluding the  proposed 
competition  agreement  as  a  "plurilateral  agreement"  under  Annex  4  to  the 
Agreement establishing the WT0
14
.  However,  the Group has  chosen to refrain 
The wro has to date played an important role as an international forum of economics-based rules. 
16 '  \ 
from  making· a  specific  recommendation  on  which_  forum  and· institutional 
framework  might  be  most  appropriate  for. negotiating  and  implementing  the 
proposed agreement.  Nonetheless,  the  Group considers it imponant to bear _in 
mind' the practical experience- as in the context ofEuropean integration, NAFTA 
and the Australian:...New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement-
that  competition  rules  and  trade  rules,  their  interpretation  and  their judicial 
enforcement, need to be mutually supportive. 
3 .2.  Determination of  common rules 
15 
The  ambition  to  go  beyond  a  simple  "comity"  agreement  and  to· establish  a 
structure for dispute settlement implies agreement on a list of minimum principles. 
The Group considers that these principles should be incof])o.rated into the national·. 
law of the participating countries in much the same way as European Directives: 
each country would have an  oblig;tion as to the result to be achieved, but would 
not  be  obliged  to  amend  its  current  legislation  if it  already  contained  these 
principles or if it was open to similar interpretation. 
Even if it is  too sopn  to  make a detailed  list of the  common principles .whicn 
should be adopted, it seems that a consensus could be built between the countries 
mentioned above on  a prohibition of horizontal  cartels relating to the fixing  of. 
prices,  restnction of supply  or the  sharing of markets.  This prohibition would 
include export cartels. 
Other types of cooperation agreement should not, however, be ruled out from the 
outset  since  these  can  also  lead  to  serious  restrictions  of  competition.  A 
"rule-of-reason"  approach is  desirable  in  these cases.  Vertical  agreements raise 
even more difficulties since opinions differ as to the conditions under which they 
are acceptable from  competition perspective.  One solution might be to prohibit. 
agreements  where  their  restrictive  effect  on  competition  is  not  offset  by  an 
advantage  for  the  consumer  and/or where they  constitute  a  barrier to  market 
access. 
As  regards  the  control  of dominant  pos1t1ons,  a  regime  similar  to  that  of 
Article 86  of the EC Treaty  appears  appropriate in  so  far  as it focuses  on  the 
abusive behaviour of enterprises in  a dominant position. 
In the field of mergers, priority should be given to a harmonization of  procedures, 
on the basis of the Whish Wood study carried out by  the OECDts. in  particular 
as  regards  the  time  limits  for  examination  of cases,  so  as. g1ve. competition 
authorities sufficient time to consult each other. 
These include rules on intellectual property, subsidies, investment, state enterprises, deregulation 
and trade liberalization, which are all related to competition law.  Importantly, the WTO also has 
a  developed  dispute  settlement  system,  which  could  be  adapted· to  the  pafticular  needs  of 
competition cases. 
OECO Merger process convergence project 
17 Lastly,  ·Article  XVII. of the  GATT  relating  to  the  obligations  of  national 
monopolies or companies with "exclusive or special privileges" would need to be 
strengthened in so far as these enterprises should generally be subject to the same 
rules as other enterprises exercising a commercial activity. 
3.3  Setting up a new structure 
The Group  considers it necessary  that an  international  body  be entrusted with 
three functions:  · 
(a)  to serve as a forum for drafting and then permanently reviewing, adapting, 
and, · in  so  far  as  possible,  extending  the  common  principles  for 
incorporation in the various national  laws and for their enforcement; this 
exercise would be carried out in  conjunction  with  analyses covering all 
aspects of the relationships between competition and trade. 
(b)  to establish a "register of anticompetitive practices" within the contracting 
States  to  the  agreement.  This  register  would  initially  concern  only 
individual  cases relating to firms  (or cartels) satisfying specific criteria, 
and  would be established on the basis of notifications by  the contracting 
countries of  the agreements they had required or encouraged.  The existing 
regimes of general  application (such  as  the block exemptions within the 
EU)  or  the  derogatory  regimes  (e.g.  the  rules  applicable  to  maritime 
transport in the United States) would also be notified. 
This  register  would  be  supplemented  by  a  register  of  non-notified 
restrictive practices, i.e. practices which had come to the knowledge of  the 
international  body,  through  countries  other  than  those  in  which  these 
practices  were  used,  or  because  it  had  been  approached  by  enterprises 
which  were  victims  of these  practices.  The  international  body  could 
question the Member State whose legislation was likely to apply to such 
practices whether it was aware of them and which measures it intended to 
take  to  deal  with  them.  The  results  of this  investigation  would  be 
forwarded to the other countries. 
(c)  provide a structure for  settling  disputes between  participating countries. 
At procedural level the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (including the 
appellate body) seems to correspond fairly  closely to the structure which 
might  be  established  to  arbitrate  on  disputes  concerning  action  by 
competition authorities,  even if some aspects (in  particular time  limits) 
should  be  reconsidered  to  take  account  of  the  inherent  nature  of 
competttlon cases.  (For further discussion  of the  GATT/WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism, see Annex 4.) 
18 3.4  Establishment of  an effective international dispute settlement and enforcement 
procedures 
.  . 
As in the field of international trade law and the GATT/WTO dispute settlement 
system, the international dispute settlement system in the context of the proposed 
plurilateral competition agreement should serve as a  framework for the settlement 
of a variety of possible conflicts,  e.g.  over the domestic implementation of the 
· international rules and over their application in concrete cases.  In particular the · 
following categories of disputes should be actionable. 
a)  Disputes over international procedural obligations 
In case of  non-notified anticompetitive practices, or if  information on these 
practices is  inadequate or contested, an  adversely affected country ,could 
invoke  the  obligations  set  out  in  a  plurilateral  cooperation  agreement 
(PCA) under the following conditions: 
If  the  notification  and  information  requirements  were  not 
voluntarily met, the injured party could request a PCA Committee 
to order specified notifications and informations.· 
If invocation of the "positive comity" obligations provided for in . 
the agreement did not lead to enforcement activities by  the other 
country,  the  adversely  affected  country  could  either  request  a 
finding  by  a  PCA. panel  on  whether  the  non-enforcement  of 
domestic competition rules violates the international  standards of· · 
·the PCA~ or it could unilaterally apply its own competition laws to 
the  anticompetitive  practices  provided this  is  consistent  wit~ its 
own legislation and with the "negative comity" obligations included 
in the PCA.  ·  .· 
An  alternative  option  could  be  to  ·resort  to  domestic  court 
proceedings in the foreign country for ajudicial review ofwhether 
the  alleged  anticompetitive  practices  are  consistent  with  the 
·domestic competition law. 
Insofar as  the objective of the above dispute  settlement procedure is to 
foster  enforcement  of  competition  law  while  avoiding  conflicts  of 
jurisdiction between Agencies, both the information exchange and positive 
comity  provisions should be subject to  strict procedural obligations and 
time limits.  This will  enable a requesting authority  to.ascertain rapidly 
whether the third country ·agency intends to act in  a specific case. 
b)  Disputes over international per-se-prohibitions 
Where a  competition authority  has  had  a  case referred to it by  anoth_er 
country  (party  to  the  PCA),  in  conformity  with  the  positive  comity 
procedure, yet fails to act against behaviour subject to per se prohibition,· 
the matter could then be brought before a PCA dispute settlement panel. 
A  panel  finding  of such ·a  violation  would  trigger  the  international 
"secondary obligations" .recognized in  GATT-WTO law (i.e. cessation of 
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the illegal act and possibility of authorization of countermeasures pending 
the withdrawal of the illegal act,  such as suspension of reciprocal  market 
access obligations).  The PCA could also provide for additional civil law 
sanctions  such  as  that  anticompetitive  practices  violating· per-se-
prohibitions  are  not  enforceable  at law.  Such  a  rule  would  have  the 
political  advantage  of making  domestic courts part of the  international 
enforcement system.  Both PCA panels and domestic courts would have 
·the power to order the submission of relevant factual  information and to 
decide  on  the basis of presumptions  and  rules  on  the allocation  of the 
burden of proof. 
c)  Disputes over international rules-of-reason 
In those areas where there is no international consensus on justiciable per-
se-prohibitions of anticompetitive practices,  the PCA would only  define 
minimum standards for national  rules-of-reason and rules of conflicts of 
jurisdiction.  This is an  area where the experience gained under bilateral 
agreements can  contribute to progressive consensus building.  But, since 
the application of the domestic rules-of-reason would be guided only by 
international  minimum  standards  and  would  require  the  appraisal  of 
complex economic matters, the international PCA panel could apply only 
a limited standard of review with due deference to the national  scope of 
discretion  (e.g.  through  review  by  PCA panels of whether the  relevant 
procedural  rules have been complied with, whether the statement of the 
reasons for the national decision is adequate, whether the facts have been 
accurately stated, whether there has been any "manifest error of appraisal" 
·of the facts or whether there has been a "misuse of powers"). 
d)  Disputes over nullification or impairment of market access as a result of 
anticompetitive practices 
Another  course  of action  could  be  created  by  tying  the  PCA  to  the 
framework established by  the WTO governing international trade.  If this 
option  were  retained  it  would  have  the  advantage of strengthening the 
linkage be~een market access commitments as embodied and negotiated 
·in the WTO on the one hand, 
16  and rules on anticompetitive practices on 
the other.  This would both contribute to open trade and promote mutual 
consistency. 
A  major  step  in  enhancing  the  complementarity  between  trade  and 
competition policies would be taken by the inclusion, within a competition 
framework,  of provisions  by  which  the  "nullification  or  impairment" 
through private practices of market access commitments negotiated under 
the WTO would be actionable, unless appropriate corrective measures are 
take~ by country concerned. A similar approach was taken in the Havana 
Charter (Article 46), where an absence of government action to prevent a 
The  GATS  Agreement,  in  its  Article  VIII,  already  contains  a  prohibition  to  impair,  through 
monopolies and  exclusive  services  suppliers,  benefits granted  under specific  commitments  in 
services schedules.  · 
20 limitation  of  access  to  markets  could  constitute  a  violation  of  its 
provisions. It'is clear, however, that in assessing private practices that may 
limit access to markets,  the efficiency goals fundamental  to competition 
policy would be upheld.  Thu~ the international  dimension would be one 
of the  factors  of review  competition  authorities  would  have  to  weigh 
following an  international request. 
In addition to the above, a case of "nullification or impairment" of market 
access commitments negotiated.under GATT law or GATS law could be 
constructed on the basis of as a "non-violation" complaint as traditionally 
recognised_  in  the  WTO.  The ·principles  underlying  "non-violation" 
complaint$ could be progressively  refined and developed through agreed 
definitions and dispute settlement practice. 
4.  Summary of the Group's recommendations 
In summary, the principal recommendations of the Group are as follows:.. 
4.1  Given their common interest in preventing anti-competitive activity, countries or 
regional groupings of countries should be encouraged to ensure that they haye in 
place an adequate set of competition rules and that these are effectively enforced. 
Where  necessary,  technical  assistance  should  be  provided  for  those  countries 
requiring it, in particular developing countries. 
4.2  The building block approach proposed by the Group is to make head\Yay  on two 
fronts in  parallel.  , 
On the one hand,  there should be a  deepening of bilateral  Agreements 
(i.e. to include the possibility of exchanging confidential information and 
to strengthen the  use of the positive comity instrument).  In this respect, 
a  "second  generation"  agreement  between  the  EC  and  the  USA  is  a . 
priority.  This  agreement  would  create  a  framework  for  even  closer 
cooperation  between  the  competition  authorities  of  both  sides.  A 
~  necessary  further  step  for  the  EC  would  be  to  negotiate· a  bilateral 
agreement with Japan. 
On  the  other  hand  a  plurilateral  framework  should· be  developed  (Le. · 
including  most  elements  already  incorporated  into  the · bilatenll · 
Agreements,  to  which  would  be  added  a  set  of minimum  appropriate 
competition rules,  a binding positive comity instrument and  an  effective 
dispute settlement mechanism)  .. It is realistic to assume that a plurilateral 
framework would, in the first instance, include a group of core disciplines 
and  core countries only  (i:e.  the EC,  the OECD member countries,  the 
central  and  eastern  European  countries;  and  for  example Korea,  Hong 
Kong,  Singapore  and  Taiwan),  although  it  should  be  open  to ·wider 
participation.  The creation of an effective competition law enforcement 
structure  requires  sophisticated  legal  instruments  and  analytical 
capabilities:  having  these  may  not  be  considered  a  priority  in  all· 
21 developing countries.  Such a plurilateral agreement would develop and 
expand its coverage progressively through a domino effect, both in terms. 
of its  geographic  scope,  substantive  coverage  and  surveillance.  The 
surveillance structures would concentrate on the transposition of common 
international  rules  into  national  law  and  on  ensuring  the  respect  and 
enforcement of these common rules. 
4.3  The Group considers that these recommendations can develop in parallel as both 
initiatives are complementary and  mutually supportive.  Countries may wish to 
maintain bilateral  relations with  certain other countries.  At the same time,  they 
·may  wish  to  move  more  quickly  to  ph.irilateral  agreement  with  a  group  of 
countries with which they have common interests.  It would, however, be counter-
productive to have  the  creation  of a  multilateral·  struc~re dependent upon  the 
willingness to participate of all  potential partners.  In this respect the development 
of a plurilateral framework is  more likely to succeed in  an  environment which 
allows it to evolve and expand over time. 
The elaboration  of a  plurilateral  framework  is  likely  to  take some time,  and 
progress in  negotiating such a framework  would  be enhanced by  strengthening 
bilateral agreements, a goal  which could be reached at shorter notice. 
Given the compelling  arguments for  moving  ahead  in  this  field,  the Group is 
convinced that the European Union and its principal partners should without delay 
take the necessary steps to implement these recommendations. 
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23 ANNEX B 
Text of the letter of convocation 
The recent success of the Uruguay Round and the resulting progressive elimination of 
public  restraints  to  world  trade  has  reemphasized  the  need  to  put  an  end  to  private 
practices which disrupt trade between the world's major trading areas. 
The institution  of international  competition  rules,  as  well  as  the  creation  of effective 
implementation procedures once foreseen in  the Havana Charter, are issues that are now 
being revisited. 
In order to consider these issues and contribute towards a European community approach 
-based largely on our past experience on the integration of  the internal market- Mr.  Van 
Miert seeks to convene a small  group of high level  experts: 
Mr Van Miert has therefore requested that I contact you to invite you to participate in the 
work of this group. 
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